UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/48/410
S/26465
17 September 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Items 34, 35, 85 and 86 of
the provisional agenda*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES
IN THE NEAR EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS
OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 17 September 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Madagascar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the congratulatory messages sent, following the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement, by His Excellency Albert Zafy, President of the Republic of Madagascar (annex I), His Excellency Francisque Ravony, Prime Minister and Head of Government (annex II), and His Excellency Jacques Sylla, Minister for Foreign Affairs (annexes III and IV).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its four annexes circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 34, 35, 85 and 86 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Noël RAKOTONDRAMBOA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/48/150 and Corr.1.

ANNEX I

Letter dated 13 September 1993 from the President of Madagascar addressed to the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization

The signing of the historic agreement on mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization affords me the opportunity to convey to you the warm congratulations of the Malagasy Government and people.

This courageous decision by the two parties is a major step forward in the search for a global political solution in the Middle East.

This is why the Republic of Madagascar encourages the negotiation currently in progress between the various parties, and hopes that they will soon result in a general agreement that will be the harbinger of a lasting peace in the region.

(Signed) Albert ZAFY
President of the Republic
of Madagascar

ANNEX II

Letter dated 13 September 1993 from the Prime Minister of Madagascar addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel

The Government of the Republic of Madagascar welcomes the signing today in Washington of the historic agreement on mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

This represents major progress in the search for a global political solution to the problem of the Middle East.

This is why the Government of the Republic of Madagascar encourages all parties in the negotiation process currently in progress to make every effort to ensure the speedy conclusion of a general agreement establishing lasting peace in the region.

(Signed) Francisque RAVONY

ANNEX III

Letter dated 13 September 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Madagascar addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

I have the honour to express to you my deep satisfaction at the signing of the historic agreement on mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

I take this opportunity to reaffirm the consistent position of the Government of Madagascar, which supports a global and lasting solution to the problem of the Middle East.

In conclusion, I reiterate my encouragement to all interested parties that have untiringly contributed to the establishment of a climate of renewed dialogue and to the advent of a new era of peace in the Middle East.

(Signed) Jacques SYLLA

ANNEX IV

Letter dated 13 September 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Madagascar addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization

I have the honour to convey to you my warm congratulations on the signing of the historic agreement on mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

I take this opportunity to commend the courage of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, which has made it possible to foresee a better future for the two fraternal peoples.

I express the hope that the process of negotiations currently in progress between the various parties will result in the establishment of true peace in the region of the Middle East.

(Signed) Jacques SYLLA
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26466
17 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I have the honour to inform you that in consultations in connection with Security Council resolution 821 (1993) of 28 April 1993, the members of the Council agreed to keep the subject-matter of that resolution under continuous review and to consider it again at a later date.

(Signed) Adolfo Raul TAYLHARDAT
President of the Security Council

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26467
18 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THAILAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Joint Communiqué between H.E. Mr. Chuan Leekpai, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, and H.R.H. Sdech Krom Luong Norodom Ranariddh and H.E. Mr. Hun Sen, the Co-Presidents of the Provisional National Government of Cambodia, issued in Bangkok on 13 August 1993 on the occasion of the Co-Presidents' official visit to the Kingdom of Thailand from 12 to 15 August 1993.

I should be grateful if the text of the Joint Communiqué were to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nitya PIBULSONGGRAM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Joint Communiqué

1. At the invitation of H.E. Mr. Chuan Leekpai, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, His Royal Highness Sdech Krom Luong Norodom Ranariddh and H.E. Mr. Hun Sen, Co-Presidents of the Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC), paid an official visit to the Kingdom of Thailand from 12 to 15 August 1993.

2. During their visit to Thailand, His Royal Highness Sdech Krom Luong Norodom Ranariddh and H.E. Mr. Hun Sen, accompanied by Princess Marie and Mrs. Bun Sam Hieng, were granted an audience with Their Majesties the King and the Queen. The Co-Presidents also visited many places of interest in Bangkok and in Phuket.

3. The Co-Presidents of the PNGC held official talks with H.E. Mr. Chuan Leekpai on 13 August 1993 at Government House. Present at the talks on the Thai side were H.E. Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsiri, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other high-ranking officials; on the Cambodian side were H.R.H. Prince Norodom Sirivudh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and other high-ranking officials.

The talks took place in an atmosphere of friendship, understanding and cooperation.

4. The Thai side welcomed the first official visit by the Co-Presidents of the PNGC to Thailand as it helped to strengthen the already close neighbourly relationship between Thailand and Cambodia. The Thai side also congratulated H.R.H. Sdech Krom Luong Norodom Ranariddh and H.E. Mr. Hun Sen on the establishment of the PNGC and their appointment as Co-Presidents of the PNGC. The Thai side informed the Cambodian side that they were encouraged by the establishment of the PNGC as it laid a foundation for peace in Cambodia and expressed full support to the PNGC in its continued implementation of the peace process and in its effort to work towards national reconciliation.

5. The two sides praised the role of His Royal Highness Samdech Presh Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State and President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, in unifying the Cambodian people and in bringing about genuine national reconciliation as well as peace and progress in Cambodia.

6. The Cambodian side expressed appreciation for Thailand's constructive role in supporting the peace process in Cambodia. The Cambodian side briefed the Thai side on the latest developments of the situation in Cambodia, namely the progress in the drafting of the constitution and the ongoing efforts to arrive at lasting peace and national reconciliation.

7. The two sides expressed satisfaction with the present state of the relationship between the two countries. Both sides reaffirmed their full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of each other. The two sides were of the view that closer ties of friendship, cooperation and good-neighbourliness would meet the interests of

their peoples and contribute to peace, prosperity and stability in the South-East Asian region.

8. Both sides shared the view that there exists great potential for the strengthening of the relationship between the two countries and reaffirmed their determination to concretely promote economic, social and cultural cooperation, especially in the fields of trade, investment, tourism, agriculture, education, civil aviation, fishery and energy. In order to expand economic cooperation, the Cambodian side agreed to honour legitimate business contracts previously entered upon by Thai businessmen and Cambodian parties, and by Cambodian businessmen and Thai parties. In order to promote trade and contact between the peoples of the two countries, both sides also agreed to expedite the process of opening permanent crossing points between Thailand and Cambodia after appropriate preparations are in place. Pending this, the two sides agreed to promote their cooperation against theft, robbery and all illegal activities, with a view to providing and assuring a peaceful and stable situation along the Thai-Cambodian border.

9. The Thai side reiterated its firm intention to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia. The Cambodian side expressed gratitude to the Thai Government for the repair and restoration of highway route 5 between Poipet-Sisophon and the reconstruction of three Thai-Cambodian friendship schools in Ban Nimitr, Poipet and Wat Khao Phnom Ba, Battambang Province, Cambodia. The Cambodian side would confirm the date for the opening ceremony of the highway which would be presided over by the Prime Ministers of the two countries. The Cambodian side also expressed its interest in seeking cooperation from the Thai side in the repair and restoration of highway route 18 from Dentong to Sra Ambel, Koh Kong Province, the road from O-Smach to Ampil, Siemreap - Oddar Meanchey Province, as well as the railway from Poipet to Sisophon, Battambang Province. The Thai side expressed its readiness to study the above request of the Cambodian side.

10. In response to a request from the Cambodian side, the Thai side agreed to favourably consider providing military uniforms to the Cambodian Armed Forces. The Cambodian side expressed its appreciation for continued Thai cooperation in human resources development and technical assistance in various fields, particularly in public health, agriculture, science and technology.

11. Both sides noted the significance of Cambodia's presence at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), held recently in Singapore. The Thai side expressed its sincere hope of seeing Cambodia's greater participation in regional cooperation at the next AMM/Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) to be held in Thailand in 1994.

12. The two sides welcomed the successful outcome of the visit to the Kingdom of Thailand by the Co-Presidents of the PNGC and agreed that there should be a more frequent exchange of visits by delegations of the two countries in the future. The Co-Presidents invited H.E. Mr. Chuan Leekpai to pay an official visit to Cambodia. The Prime Minister of Thailand accepted the kind invitation with pleasure and would communicate the dates of the visit later through diplomatic channels.

Done at Bangkok on 13 August 1993.

For the Provisional National
Government of Cambodia

Sdech Krom Luong Norodom RANARIDDH
HUN SEN
Co-Presidents of the Provisional
National Government of Cambodia

For the Government of the
Kingdom of Thailand

Chuan LEEKPAI
Prime Minister of the Kingdom

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26468
30 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should like to refer to Security Council resolutions 807 (1993), 815 (1993), 836 (1993), 844 (1993) and 847 (1993) and my reports S/25264 of 10 February 1993 and S/25939 of 14 June 1993.

It will be recalled that in operative paragraph 8 of its resolution 807 (1993), the Security Council has invited the Secretary-General to take all appropriate measures to strengthen the security of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), in particular by providing it with the necessary means of self-defence. In that resolution and when extending UNPROFOR's mandate in resolutions 815 (1993) and 847 (1993), the Council invoked Chapter VII of the Charter with a view to ensuring the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In operative paragraph 10 of its resolution 836 (1993), the Security Council decided that in the context of the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, may take all necessary measures in support of UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate.

The Force Commander of UNPROFOR is of the opinion that the problems relating to the security of the Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia are directly interrelated. Should air power be used in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a strong possibility of retaliatory action against UNPROFOR in the UNPAs. Moreover, despite the upgrading of its defensive capabilities on the ground, the widely dispersed deployment of UNPROFOR in the UNPAs leaves its units unacceptably vulnerable to possible attacks. The Force Commander has, therefore, recommended that the authority to use air support for defensive purposes be extended to UNPROFOR's units in Croatia.

I concur with the assessment of the Force Commander and would, therefore, appreciate a clarification by the Security Council as to whether the necessary defensive means mentioned in its resolution 807 (1993) may include the provision of air support in defence of UNPROFOR in Croatia.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26469
28 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993.

Annex

Letter dated 18 May 1993 from the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour of addressing to you an advance copy of the report which I submit pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/7. I would be most grateful if you could arrange for this report to be made available, at your earliest convenience, to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tadeusz MAZOWIECKI
Special Rapporteur on the Situation
of Human Rights in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia

Appendix

Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia

Second periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993

Introduction */

1. By April/May 1993 tension between the Government and Croat forces, erstwhile allies, had erupted into open hostilities in places such as Donji Vakuf, Gornji Vakuf, Konjic, Jablanica, Travnik, Vitez and, most recently, in the area of Zenica and Mostar. Grave allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been made against both parties. It has been conservatively estimated that 5,000 people were displaced in central Bosnia in one week in early May. However, figures are very difficult to confirm because people are hiding, afraid of both the actual fighting and of ethnic persecution. Looting, rape, executions and intimidation are reported to be commonplace.

2. A team of the Special Rapporteur's field staff visited the Lasva valley area of central Bosnia and Herzegovina, the scene of fighting between the two forces, from 30 April to 7 May 1993. This report is based on their interviews with eye-witnesses, on-site investigations, meetings with local civil and military authorities as well as with representatives of Croat forces in de facto control of relevant areas. While it was not possible to conduct an exhaustive investigation of all allegations, this report is primarily composed of the findings of the Special Rapporteur's field staff and illustrates the need for further investigations to be carried out in a systematic way with the necessary personnel and resources. For example, it was not possible on this occasion satisfactorily to investigate the serious allegations, such as mass arbitrary detentions and expulsions of civilians, which have been made in connection with recent hostilities between government and Croat forces in Zenica. Both forces are alleged to have violated international humanitarian law in their treatment of the civilian population of the other party.

3. In addition to the information gathered by field staff, the Special Rapporteur is, once again, grateful to the international organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies active in the area for their cooperation and support.

4. The investigation was carried out by field staff under very difficult conditions. On one occasion, field staff visited the village of Ahmici near the town of Vitez and came under sniper fire when they attempted to obtain testimony from local residents. Although the identity of the snipers could not be established, this area is under the de facto control of the Croat Defence Council (HVO), whose forces have been implicated in the destruction of Ahmici. The Special Rapporteur strongly condemns such attempts to obstruct investigations by field staff. It was only thanks to the cooperation of the British battalion of UNPROFOR that the team was able to return to this village later to complete the investigation.

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*/ The present report should be read in the context of those previously submitted by the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9; E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10; A/47/666; E/CN.4/1993/50; E/CN.4/1994/3).

5. Reliable information has been gathered regarding several of the individuals responsible for the violations of human rights and humanitarian law outlined here. For the safety of witnesses, their identities and locations are not published in this report. However, the testimonies and other information gathered has been forwarded to the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992).

6. While it has not been possible to deal in this report with events elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Special Rapporteur would like to draw attention to the fact that ethnic cleansing by Serb forces did not end when control of an area was taken by military force. Intimidation and persecution of Muslims and Croats in places such as Banja Luka and Bijeljina continue to force them to leave. It is feared that in there areas the end of the process of ethnic cleansing is rapidly approaching.

I. ETHNIC CLEANSING BY CROAT FORCES

A. Background

7. Lasva valley in central Bosnia and Herzegovina stretches from Travnik in the north-west to Busovaca in the south-east and includes Dubravica, Nova Bila and the town of Vitez. According to the peace plan proposed by the negotiators of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, the valley would form part of province 10 which would be under Croat administration. The population of this proposed province is predominantly Croat but in many parts of the Lasva valley region, Muslims constitute a majority. This is particularly the case with the city of Travnik, which would be the provincial capital. Its pre-war population was 45.3 per cent Muslim, 36.9 per cent Croat and 16.8 per cent others. Muslim residents of the city and the surrounding areas are reported to be extremely reluctant to accept a Croat administration. For example, a recent attempt to replace the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the flag of the so-called Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosna on all government buildings in Travnik led to considerable tension and violence.

8. The main transport routes of central Bosnia and Herzegovina, cross the Lasva valley and the area is regarded as being of great strategic importance. Both the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croat HVO forces are vying for control of the area.

B. The town of Vitez

9. In the early morning of 16 April armed clashes broke out between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croat HVO forces in the town of Vitez. There were also simultaneous and apparently concerted attacks by Croat HVO forces on the surrounding villages. Most of the villages appear to have been defended and combat ensued, with the notable exception of Ahmici, which is discussed below. Very little territory seems to have changed hands although the town of Vitez is now split by the confrontation line between the two forces which runs through it. Hundreds of civilians are said to have been killed. The bodies of 101 civilian dead have been identified in the town of Vitez. Of these, 96 were Muslim and 5 were Croat.

10. International observers reported that on several occasions during these clashes, they saw Croat HVO soldiers throwing grenades into homes and shooting indiscriminately at civilians. These witnesses also report that a number of families were executed in their homes by bullets to the head at very close range by Croat forces and that at least one multiple rape was committed by these soldiers.

11. Systematic expulsions of non-Croats from their homes and hiding places by HVO forces is also reported to have taken place in and around Vitez. The requirement to create additional housing for expected arrivals of displaced persons has been used as an argument attempting to justify such forcible expulsions.

12. Leading Croat political figures in the Lasva valley region are reported as constantly using the media as a means of "demonizing" other ethnic groups. Atrocities against Muslims or Serbs are rarely if ever reported and are usually blamed on Serb forces or an unknown group of "extremists". In contrast, relatively minor incidents involving Croats are exaggerated and sensationalized. It is reported that in the days prior to the attack on Muslim civilians in the area of Vitez and the Lasva valley, a prominent local member of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) suggested on the radio, without any apparent justification, that a massive attack by government forces was imminent, that "Mujahidin" forces would destroy the entire town and commit atrocities against women and children. All Muslim residents in Vitez were identified as conspirators in this plan, portrayed as "Islamic fundamentalists" and threatened with death. This is reported to have added greatly to the climate of fear and hatred in the area.

C. The village of Ahmici

13. The village of Ahmici is approximately 2 kilometres east of the town of Vitez in central Bosnia and Herzegovina. Until 16 April, the population was approximately 800, about 90 per cent of whom were Muslim. The village housed an estimated 300 Muslims who had previously been forcibly displaced from other areas. According to the peace plan proposed by negotiators of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, the village would form part of a province under Croat administration.

14. By all accounts, including those of the local Croat HVO commander and international observers, this village contained no legitimate military targets and there was no organized resistance to the attack.

15. In the early morning of 16 April, at approximately 5.30 a.m. Croat HVO forces launched a mortar attack on the northern part of the village of Ahmici. The shelling effectively prevented people from fleeing towards the wooded area to the north of the village. The villagers were thus presented with the choice of remaining in their homes or fleeing south towards the main road to Vitez. It appears that a large number of residents chose the latter option and ran southwards to an open field where Croat HVO forces were waiting. At least 20 fleeing civilians were ambushed at the field and shot at close range, mainly in the head and neck. There appear to have been no survivors of this ambush. Field staff visited the scene and found three vantage points where high-powered, sniper-calibre shell casings had been left behind.

16. While the northern side of the village was being shelled, Croat HVO soldiers reportedly walked into the village and moved, in groups of five or more, from house to house shooting and throwing grenades through doors and windows. Field staff counted an average of 50 spent shells around each house from a variety of weapons including rocket-propelled grenades. It appears that in a number of cases, residents were ordered to come out of their homes and were summarily executed. In other cases, soldiers entered the homes to execute the inhabitants. Many of the houses had been deliberately torched.

17. One eye-witness, who was in a house on the edge of the village, related how he had hidden behind a couch in one room, as Croat HVO soldiers burst into the other. The family of the house were in the next room: a father, mother, four-year-old boy and three-month-old infant. The witness heard a burst of machine gun fire and saw the husband and wife fall to the ground. The soldiers then poured petrol, which they carried in glass bottles, all over the rooms, including the couch, behind which the witness was hiding. The house was then ignited with matches. The witness was unable to determine whether the family had been killed by the gun-shots before being set on fire. After waiting a few moments, the witness crawled out of the house to lie in a hollow before fleeing to a neighbouring village. Serious burns were sustained on his hands, legs and down one side of his body. On the basis of the witnesses' testimony, the charred remains of the family were located in the shell of the house by field staff and buried by the British batallion of UNPROFOR.

18. In another house, eight bodies, burnt beyond recognition, were found. What appeared to be the remains of an adult and young child were found on the doorstep while the remains of four to six persons (it was reportedly not possible to determine with exactitude how many) were found in the cellar. The remains in the cellar are reported to be those of a mother and her four children and it has not been possible to determine the cause of death. There is reason to suspect that these people may have been burned alive.

19. Of the 89 bodies which have been recovered from the village, most are those of elderly people, women, children and infants. A list of 101 possible victims was obtained through the testimony of displaced persons who had witnessed killings. When the Special Rapporteur's field staff visited the village in early May, some of the approximately 180 destroyed houses were still smouldering, two weeks after the attack. Most of their roofs had caved in. During or after the attack, the two mosques in the village were destroyed, one with explosives; the other was gutted by fire and was still smouldering when field staff visited the village. It is estimated that as many as 100 bodies may still remain under the rubble in the village but attempts to retrieve them are very hazardous due to the instability of remaining walls. The village is described as "stinking of death".

20. All the approximately 180 Muslim homes were effectively destroyed. There are now no Muslims in the village. The 15 or so Croat homes in Ahmici were left untouched in the attack and some of the Croat villagers remain. Some of these people confirmed that they had been present during the attack but were unwilling to discuss the events of 16 April.

21. During the attack, approximately 150 Muslims were rounded up and detained for 16 days in the Braca Ribara school in Dubravica. Their release was

secured by the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Field staff met about 100 of the ex-detainees in Zenica, three days after their release. The vast majority of those detained were women and children. They reported that they were given very little food and alleged that two of the women were raped by their Croat HVO guards.

22. Some Muslims from Ahmici fled to Vitez and surrounding villages. There are reports that, in at least some cases, Muslims are being hidden by Croats in areas under Croat HVO control. In addition, about 200 people from Ahmici have sought shelter in Zenica but approximately 300 of its original Muslim population have yet to be accounted for.

23. At least 50 and possibly up to 150 soldiers are reported to have been involved in the operation. According the testimonies gathered from the 50-60 survivors interviewed, the soldiers were all wearing Croat HVO uniforms. It appears that some of the attackers were from Ahmici itself as well as surrounding villages and eye-witnesses identified 18 Croat HVO soldiers from the area by name.

24. Local and regional military leaders of Croat HVO forces, as well as a local leader of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), the political party in government in Croatia, adamantly denied allegations that their soldiers carried out such attacks around Vitez. They suggested that Serb forces or irregulars of the Croatian Defence Council (HOS) may have been responsible. It is highly improbable that Serb forces were involved. The attacks in the Lasva valley on 16 April involved several hundred soldiers deep within areas under the control of Croat HVO forces. The village of Ahmici is itself less than 2 kilometres from the HVO headquarters in Vitez. Nor does there appear to be evidence that Croat HOS irregular forces were involved. These forces are readily identifiable by their distinctive black uniforms and although some were present in the area of hostilities at the time (as well as later), none of the eye-witnesses alleged that Croat HOS forces were involved.

25. As of the writing of this report, no investigation of the allegations has been conducted by any of the Croat military or political leaders in de facto control of the area.

D. The city of Mostar

26. On 9 May, fighting broke out between the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croat HVO forces in and around the city of Mostar. At the time of writing this report, several cease-fires agreed by the parties had not succeeded in ending the fighting there.

27. On the night of 9 May, large numbers of Muslim civilians, together with a much smaller number of Serbs, were rounded up in their homes and are now detained by Croat forces in a disused aircraft factory south of the town. On 12 May, international relief workers were allowed very brief access to this detention camp where between 1,500 and 2,000 people are now held. The detainees include women and children who are kept separated from the male detainees and many are concerned as to the whereabouts of family members as no communication is allowed between the groups.

28. Conditions in the former factory and the adjacent buildings being used to house the detainees are reported to be squalid, especially for the men. Up to 60 people are held in one room, frequently without mattresses or blankets to sleep on. Some rooms in the men's quarters have insufficient space for the men to sleep fully outstretched. Food is reported to be a couple of biscuits and a glass of milk or water per day. Basic hygiene necessities such as soap or toilet paper have not been provided. The humiliation of the detainees is reported to be acute.

29. There are allegations that some of the detainees are being held underground and tortured. However, no investigation of this has yet been possible.

30. The Croat forces running the camp argue that the women and children are free to leave and were brought to the camp to protect them from the heavy fighting in the city. The Croat forces running the camp have stated that those whose homes have not been destroyed by the fighting will be able to return there when the fighting ceases. The others would be kept at their current location.

31. It is certainly the case that there has been heavy fighting in the city. The vast majority of the detainees are Muslim with a handful of Serbs and it is reported that their Croat neighbours living in the same apartment blocks were not so detained. Selection for arbitrary detention was clearly made on the basis of ethnicity. Detainees have alleged that they were forcibly removed from their homes with only a few minutes' notice with some people being removed in their underwear. It is also reported that they were not allowed to bring personal possessions. The camp is under heavily armed guard and at least some detainees are said to be in fear for their lives. Some of the detainees have been removed from the camp and remain to be accounted for.

32. It is reported that in mid-April the Croat military and civilian authorities in de facto control of Mostar issued a regulation which seriously restricts the rights enjoyed earlier by displaced persons in the town. The regulation is reported as redefining the criteria for eligibility for refugee identity documents which are necessary for the receipt of humanitarian assistance. It appears that new identity documents will only be issued to minors between the ages of 1 and 17 years, women over the age of 55 years and men over 60, who do not live in abandoned flats and who come from "occupied" areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Croatia. The new cards would reportedly only be provided until UNHCR can provide suitable accommodation in safe countries not affected by war.

33. It is estimated that there are 16,000 displaced persons in Mostar. It is very difficult to ascertain how many of these will be disqualified from humanitarian assistance, but one estimate put this number as high as 10,000. It is estimated that the overwhelming majority of displaced persons in Mostar are Muslim and many of them live in abandoned flats.

34. There is serious reason for concern that the effect of this regulation will be to force displaced people, usually non-Croats, onto the streets and render them ineligible for humanitarian assistance so as to force them to

leave Mostar. Another effect of this regulation is expected to be to empty the abandoned flats for use by the Croats whom the Mostar Croat leaders expect to arrive from Zenica.

35. Even prior to this new regulation, there were reports of forced evictions of Serbs from their homes, often at gunpoint, to accommodate Croat HVO soldiers and their families in their place.

36. From this behaviour it would appear that there is a deliberate attempt to partition Mostar, the capital of the Herzegovina area, into Croat and Muslim areas and then to exchange populations between the provinces which the peace plan proposed by the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia accords to the respective parties.

II. ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES IN THE VITEZ AREA

37. Croat civilians have also been the victims of violations of humanitarian law. Field staff visited the village of Miletici, north of Vitez, and gathered testimony which alleges how, around 16 April, members of government forces from neighbouring villages and "Mujahidin" encircled the village and selected five young Croat men, some of whom who were then tortured before they and the others were executed. Croat residents reported that government forces from the village normally protect them against such attacks. Twenty-seven of the 34 Croat inhabitants of the village are said to have left in fear for their lives.

III. CONCLUSIONS

38. The information gathered in the preparation of this report demonstrates that the recent eruption of hostilities between Croat and government forces in central Bosnia and Herzegovina involved massive and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

39. The forced displacement and detention of civilians, arbitrary executions, attacks on towns as well as the destruction of villages and religious sites have become part of a deliberate and systematic policy of ethnic cleansing conducted by Croat forces in that region. The fate of the civilian population of Ahmici is a particularly shocking application of this policy.

40. Arbitrary executions and torture have been carried out by government forces. The danger of retaliation for ethnic cleansing committed by Croat forces against Croat civilians in towns such as Zenica is a real one.

41. The credibility of the parties' commitment to human rights will be tested by their willingness to bring to justice the perpetrators of such atrocities as are outlined in this report.

42. Commitments which all parties to the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina have repeatedly entered into to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, including written agreements concluded upon international mediation, have been systematically violated.

43. The peace plan, according to which Bosnia and Herzegovina would be divided along ethnic lines, has been used in order to create ethnically homogenous areas. The lack of an effective international response to counter the policy of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serb forces from the beginning of the war created the precedent of impunity which has allowed them to continue and which has encouraged Croat forces to adopt the same policy.

44. Without stopping the war and without applying sufficient pressure to force an end to human rights violations any attempts to find a just and lasting political solution will be doomed to fail.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26470
20 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 743 (1992)

INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 847 (1993) of 30 June 1993, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an additional interim period terminating on 30 September 1993, and requested the Secretary-General to report after one month on progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions. On 16 August 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Council (S/26310) on this matter. In his report, he recommended that no action be taken at that stage to reconsider UNPROFOR's mandate in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and said that he would submit a further recommendation to the Council in the latter half of September 1993. The present report is intended to assist the Security Council in its deliberations on the renewal of the mandate of UNPROFOR.

I. UNPROFOR STRUCTURE

2. UNPROFOR is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, and includes military, civil affairs (including civilian police) and administrative components, with overall headquarters in Zagreb, Croatia. As of 10 September 1993 the strength of the military personnel, led by the Force Commander, General Jean Cot of France, amounted to 24,281, including 456 United Nations military observers. There are 628 civilian police, 695 international civilian staff (including 306 contractual personnel who are not members of the international civil service) and 974 local staff.

II. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

3. The Bosnia and Herzegovina command of UNPROFOR, headquartered in Kiseljak, and led by Lt. General Francis Briquemont of Belgium, consists of 11,511 military, civilian and police personnel. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Command operates under a series of Security Council mandates relating, inter alia, to Sarajevo airport, the protection of humanitarian convoys and the safe areas. Sarajevo airport continues to provide the main humanitarian lifeline for the city of Sarajevo. This well-organized operation has received more than 4,700

humanitarian flights since its inception in June 1992. UNPROFOR's presence in several other areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has, to a limited extent, contributed to a lessening of tensions and has facilitated the passage of humanitarian convoys. The achievement of an overall peace settlement for the Republic would have a significant impact upon the work of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. However, in recent months, continued hostilities in central and southern Bosnia have seriously undermined the capability of UNPROFOR, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies to deliver humanitarian assistance there and elsewhere. Intense fighting in this region has blocked the main supply routes for humanitarian assistance into northern Bosnia, and the deliberate targeting of United Nations vehicles and personnel has further restricted the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and UNHCR in the area. In this connection, UNPROFOR and UNHCR have initiated a humanitarian "Operation Lifeline" to keep the main routes open to help ensure the survival of up to 2.2 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the forthcoming winter. It will only work effectively if there is a political agreement leading to peace and if adequate funding is forthcoming.

III. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

5. The Secretary-General last submitted a report to the Security Council in respect of UNPROFOR's operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 13 July 1993 (S/26099). The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia command of UNPROFOR, led by Brigadier-General Finn Saermark-Thomsen of Denmark, now consists of 1,190 military, civilian and police personnel. A Nordic battalion is based at Kjojila, east of Skopje, and a United States contingent of 315 troops arrived in Skopje in early July, deploying to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia side of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on 20 August 1993. United Nations military observers, United Nations civilian police (UNCIVPOL) and civil affairs officers have also been deployed. Since early 1993 the northern border and the western border north of Debar have been constantly monitored from observation posts and by regular patrols. United Nations military observers and civilian police also mount regular patrols in their areas of operation. UNPROFOR maintains close cooperation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) monitor mission there. It now also, in cooperation with the authorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and CSCE's sanctions assistance mission, monitors traffic crossing the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This first venture into the field of "preventive deployment" by the United Nations has so far been successful. UNPROFOR enjoys an excellent cooperative relationship with the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

IV. CROATIA

6. Since the renewed outbreak of hostilities in Croatia, consequent upon the Croatian incursion into the United Nations protected areas and "pink zones" on 22 January 1993, continuous endeavours have been made within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR to bring

about a cease-fire and a restoration of the prior status in accordance with Security Council resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993, in order to permit a revival of efforts to implement Security Council resolution 743 (1992) and subsequent resolutions relating to the situation in Croatia. Negotiations under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to implement resolution 802 (1993) have proceeded on a continuing and active basis. It had been hoped that, with a progressive restoration of mutual confidence between the two sides, talks could open under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on national reconciliation and on broader political questions, within the framework of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

7. However, as the Council is aware, new tensions arose following the decision of the Croatian Government, on 6 July 1993, to rebuild and reopen the Maslenica bridge on 18 July, the consequences of which have been described in the Secretary-General's report of 16 August 1993 (S/26310). Though, in pursuance of the Erdut/Zagreb agreement of 15/16 July 1993, UNPROFOR had moved 2,000 troops into the areas adjacent to those from which the Croatian forces were to withdraw, these troops could not be deployed because the Croatian military authorities would not allow UNPROFOR full access to the areas concerned. Nor did they provide any cooperation in regard to the planning of the operation or the reconnaissance for it.

8. On 2 August 1993, following Serb shelling of the area, one of the pontoons of the Maslenica bridge sank, but the Co-Chairmen concluded that there was still enough common ground to continue negotiations. They therefore extended an invitation to both sides to come to Geneva to begin negotiations on a cease-fire which would include the elements of the original Erdut/Zagreb agreement. The parties accepted the invitation and talks started on 12 August 1993 at Geneva. Despite intensive discussions in Geneva, Zagreb and Knin between the representatives of the Co-Chairmen and representatives of the parties, the most recent meetings having taken place on 9 and 10 September, it has not yet been possible to achieve an overall cease-fire agreement. However, both sides did agree to send military experts to a meeting which was to have taken place on board a ship in the Adriatic on 12 September.

9. On 9 September, after several days of grave incidents in the United Nations protected areas and "pink zones", and rising tension in Croatia, shelling intensified on both sides of the confrontation line, and the Croatian Army once again effected a military incursion. This took place in the area of Medak, where three Serb villages were seized. The hostilities worsened on 10 and 11 September, with a serious escalation in the military means employed: the Croatian Government used aircraft to bomb Serb positions, and the Serbs fired rockets and heavy missiles at Croatian population centres. Following the intervention of my Special Representative and the Force Commander, and a call from the Security Council (S/26436), the parties finally agreed to a cease-fire on 15 September. Croatian withdrawal to positions occupied before this incursion has begun after some delay, and UNPROFOR is moving some 500 to 600 troops into the area to replace the withdrawing Croatian armed forces. Efforts to restore the shipboard meeting, postponed as a result of the hostilities, are continuing.

V. OBSERVATIONS

10. The United Nations peace-keeping plan approved by the Security Council in resolution 743 (1992), which remains the cornerstone of UNPROFOR's mandate, was agreed to by Croatia, the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and by the Serb authorities in Knin. It is a plan for the withdrawal of armed forces, the return of refugees, reconciliation between Croatia and the Serb community living there and a future constitutional settlement. Subsequently, the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ceased to exist, and four of its constituent Republics - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Slovenia - became Members of the United Nations in their own right. UNPROFOR's mandate in respect of Croatia was expanded by successive resolutions of the Security Council to include such matters as the "pink zones", border control, the provisions of resolution 820 (1993) on control by Croatia of imports and exports to United Nations protected areas, as well as the tasks associated with the ongoing conflict which was resumed on 22 January 1993.

11. The political and military situation on the ground means that these mandates cannot be implemented without the cooperation of the Serb authorities in Knin, which obliges UNPROFOR to negotiate with them as well as with the Croatian Government. In this situation, UNPROFOR's credibility has been undermined, as each side, for its own reasons, blames the Force for failing to fulfil its expectations - of the restoration of normal conditions and the return of refugees, in the case of Croatia, or of protection, in the case of the local Serbs. Each declares, from time to time, its readiness to use force to achieve its political and territorial aspirations. The continuing uncertainty over the future political shape and form of a settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also affects, to a significant degree, the solution of the problem. In this situation, fighting continues, with more death and destruction; attitudes become more polarized; and peoples and economies on both sides of the confrontation line undergo increasing deprivation.

12. While some elements of UNPROFOR have been able to adapt their activities to these changed circumstances, key parts of the plan have been difficult, if not impossible, to implement, and have become more so since the resumption of hostilities following the Croatian incursion of 22 January 1993. With each subsequent unilateral action on each side of the confrontation line, the crisis has deepened. Last week's events marked the third major incursion by Croatia into areas of the United Nations protected areas or pink zones, and (except for the most recent case) it has subsequently failed to withdraw its forces, contending that these areas are "part of Croatia" and that it has a right to occupy them, if not by agreement, then by force. Many of the tasks of the military component of UNPROFOR cannot, in a situation of continuing strife, be carried out. Yet UNPROFOR members are often exposed to physical danger, and many have been harassed, threatened and abused by both Croatian and Serb armed elements. As of 13 September 1993, the Force has suffered 654 casualties, 57 of them fatal; of these, 357 and 31 respectively were in Croatia. UNPROFOR's freedom of movement is increasingly circumscribed. The Croatian leadership and press frequently express vehement criticism, sometimes bordering on vilification, of UNPROFOR, based on what can only be seen as a wilful misreading of its mandate.

13. President Tudjman of Croatia, in a letter to me dated 13 September 1993, advanced a number of considerations which he wished to be taken into account in future efforts for peace and normalization in these areas. I have transmitted this letter to the Co-Chairmen so that they may take it into account in the exercise of their good offices. One of President Tudjman's suggestions is that UNPROFOR be divided into three parts - UNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) - while retaining its integrated military, logistical and administrative structure under the command of one Special Representative of the Secretary-General and one theatre Force Commander. In view of the importance attached by the Croatian authorities to such a division, and taking into account the circumstances prevailing on the ground at the present time, I have decided to grant this suggestion favourable consideration. Accordingly, should the mandate of UNPROFOR be renewed as discussed below, I will instruct my Special Representative to take steps to implement such a division, provided that there are no additional financial implications and that overall command and coordination by himself and the Force Commander is not weakened.

14. In turning to the mandate itself, I should like to stress that the fundamental solution to the problem has to be sought through political dialogue. It is the parties themselves who bear the primary responsibility for achieving such a solution, and who must take steps towards reconciliation. In this process, the principal objective of UNPROFOR can only be to keep the peace, thereby permitting negotiations to take place on an overall political settlement.

15. As the Security Council well knows, the lack of cooperation by the parties, and in particular the refusal of the Serb side to disarm as provided for in the original plan, has prevented UNPROFOR from carrying out essential elements of its mandate. The presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia has nevertheless to some extent contained a volatile situation which, were it once again to explode, could ignite a war with far-reaching consequences. I have been sorely tempted, in the light of the criticism of UNPROFOR by both sides and the dangers and abuse to which its personnel are exposed, to recommend the withdrawal of the Force altogether, but I am conscious that such a step could only result in further conflict.

16. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it renew the mandate of UNPROFOR for a period of six months, as is usual with most United Nations peace-keeping operations. At the same time, I suggest that the Council demand that the parties in Croatia conclude an immediate cease-fire and cooperate with UNPROFOR, which must, in the first instance, be enabled to fulfil the peace-keeping aspects of its mandate. To enhance the security of the Force, I have requested the extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia (S/26468). To improve the atmosphere in which UNPROFOR's efforts are conducted, the Council may wish to direct the parties to cooperate with UNPROFOR in restoring water, power, communications and other economic necessities, as most recently demanded by the Council in resolution 847 (1993). At the conclusion of a two-month period, i.e. by 30 November 1993, I shall report to the Council on the progress which has been made by the Co-Chairmen and by UNPROFOR. I may also, at that time, convey further recommendations to the Council, on the basis of developments during these two months, and on the course of negotiations undertaken between the parties.

17. I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Force Commander, General Jean Cot, and the brave men and women of UNPROFOR for their remarkable courage and dedication in the performance of their duties. I count on them to continue to make every effort, in cooperation with the parties, to achieve the implementation of all aspects of the peace-keeping plan.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26470/Add.1
23 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 743 (1992)

Addendum

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

1. By its resolution 47/210 B of 14 September 1993, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNPROFOR at a rate not to exceed $65 million gross ($64,419,275 net) per month for the period from 1 October to 31 December 1993. This authorization is subject to the review by the Security Council of the mandate of the Force as well as to the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

2. Should the Security Council decide to renew the mandate of UNPROFOR beyond 30 September 1993, the monthly cost of maintaining the Force will be limited, initially, to the commitment authority contained in General Assembly resolution 47/210 B. The Secretary-General will report to the Advisory Committee and to the General Assembly on the additional requirements needed for the maintenance of the Force.

3. Unpaid assessed contributions to the UNPROFOR special account for the period since the inception of the Force through 31 August 1993 amounted to $178.1 million.

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UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/1023
S/26471
20 September 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH/
SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 22
THE SITUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN HAITI

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 14 September 1993 from the Secretary-General
to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to transmit to you the letter addressed to me by Mr. Christopher R. Thomas, Deputy Secretary General of the Organization of American States (see annex), conveying the text of a Declaration on the situation in Haiti, adopted by the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States on 8 September 1993.

I should be grateful if you would be kind enough to bring the text of the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

ANNEX

Letter dated 8 September 1993 from the Deputy Secretary General in charge of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the "Declaration on the situation in Haiti" adopted unanimously by the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States at its regular meeting held today (see appendix).

(Signed) Christopher R. THOMAS
Deputy Secretary General
in charge of the General Secretariat

APPENDIX

Declaration on the situation in Haiti, adopted by the Permanent Council at its meeting held on 8 September 1993 (CP/DEC.14 (960/93))

THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,

HAVING HEARD the statement by the Ambassador Permanent Representative of Haiti on the resurgence of human rights violations in that country, and aware of the press release of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights No. 16/93, dated August 27, 1993, and of information received from the UN/OAS Civilian Mission;

REITERATES its concern over such alarming reports and expresses its resolute condemnation of those responsible for the acts that have been denounced;

RECALLS that the suspension of the trade embargo and other measures adopted by the international community as a result of the overthrow of the legitimate Government of Haiti presupposes full compliance with the "Agreement of Governors Island", which embodied the commitment to carry out "a peaceful transition to a stable and lasting democratic society in which all Haitians will be able to live in a climate of freedom, justice, security and respect for human rights";

URGES the international community to transfer as a matter of urgency the resources required for the emergency programs of the Government of Prime Minister Robert Malval, and

REQUESTS the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit this Declaration to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to disseminate it as widely as possible.

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/1023*
S/26471*
23 September 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH/
SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 22
THE SITUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

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(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

* Reissued for technical reasons.

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Deputy Secretary General
in charge of the General Secretariat

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URGES the international community to transfer as a matter of urgency the resources required for the emergency programs of the Government of Prime Minister Robert Malval, and

REQUESTS the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit this Declaration to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to disseminate it as widely as possible.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26472
20 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Despite the steps taken by the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the situation in Abkhazia, the Republic of Georgia, still remains near catastrophic.

In this connection, I have the honour to transmit to you an appeal by the Chairman of the Parliament, Head of State of the Republic of Georgia, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, to all the friends of my homeland, dated 20 September 1993.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this appeal as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter P. CHKHEIDZE
Permanent Representative
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Appeal by Eduard Shevardnadze: To all the friends of my homeland

I am appealing to you from besieged Sukhumi, not knowing if my words will ever reach you. Fighting is taking place only a few blocks away from the building in which my friends and I are located. Whatever happens, I shall not leave this city which, once again, has fallen victim to deceit and treachery. I shall not leave the residents of Sukhumi, who have been subjected to suffering and deprivation in their own city, which has been left to the mercy of a brutal, inhuman force. That force is shelling residential areas. In the past two days, 40 civilians have died and 353 have been seriously wounded. Since the beginning of the war, 2,031 people have been killed and 5,802 seriously wounded.

How often have I asked myself: "what is happening? For what purpose?"

The Gudauta leaders say that they are fighting for freedom and for the right to live in their native land. But 240,000 Georgians, whose roots in this soil go back centuries, are yearning for that very same freedom and are seeking to uphold that very same right. This land has been a cradle to both Georgians and Abkhaz.

We did not intend to expel anyone, but the criminal intent of those who sponsor the Gudauta clique has led to the forced exile of 150,000 Georgians who today are dying of hunger and illness in Russian and Georgian cities. With them, thousands of Abkhaz, Russians and Armenians have been driven from their homes.

We did not intend to conquer anyone. After all, how could we subjugate our own citizens and occupy our own land, the centre of our ancient culture and statehood? We sought only to safeguard the sovereignty of the Republic, defend its vital arteries and put an end to sabotage and terror. This we wished to do with the knowledge, consent and participation of our Abkhaz fellow countrymen, and the leaders of the Abkhaz "Vendée" were aware of this. They knew that the territory of the autonomous republic was being used by bandits, aggressors and terrorists as a base for subversive activities against the Republic of Georgia, and they tolerated them, seeking to use this card to their own advantage.

They succeeded. And that success was achieved with the direct support and complicity of those forces in Russia and our country that have conspired to "quarter" Georgia. Now that the actions of the anti-national forces in Georgia itself, the "spontaneous" (as they say in Gudauta) violation of the Sochi agreement, the steps taken by some of the highest-ranking military personnel of the Russian Federation and the policy of the Russian Parliament have all coincided, we have every right to claim that this has been a well-coordinated and well-orchestrated collective blow. I want the world to realize that Abkhazia is the arena for the empire's bloody revenge, a "second August", the fuse with which they intend to blow up not only Shevardnadze's Georgia but also Yeltsin's Russia.

There is a logical sequence connecting all the events that led up to the present inferno. On 3 September 1992, we signed the final document in Moscow. The ink was still wet on the paper when the document was trampled by the boots of the mercenaries who stormed defenceless Gagra. On 14 May 1993, we agreed on a cease-fire, after which Sukhumi was attacked from land, sea and air and an assault force, armed to the teeth, invaded Ochamchire district. As a result, Sukhumi was blockaded. Finally, for the third time, having put faith in the Russian Federation's peacemaking mission and its role as guarantor and mediator, we concluded the agreement of 27 July 1993 and, once again, we were betrayed. The guns that, under the agreement, should have been withdrawn, resumed their thunder, the engines of combat equipment that was to be dismantled roared back into life, and the irregulars who had supposedly been disarmed joined the assault. Once again we have to face a bitter fact: the guarantor of the agreement either did not wish, or was unable, to discharge that duty.

My talks with General Grachev, Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, yielded no results. Although in themselves they were constructive, later that same day they were disavowed by statements by several subordinates of the Russian Minister of Defence and by the decision of the Russian Parliament.

Neither have there been any positive results from the resolutions of the Security Council and the repeated, strongly worded statements by the Secretary-General.

I do not doubt the sincerity of efforts by the President of the Russian Federation to promote a settlement to the conflict; in this, however, he is impeded by the same force which is trying to crush us.

That notwithstanding, I appeal once again to Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin, to the United Nations Security Council and Mr. Boutros-Ghali, to the entire progressive and democratic Russian nation and to all the peoples of the world: do not allow this monstrous crime to be committed, halt the execution of a small country and save my homeland and my people from perishing in the fires of imperial reaction. The world must not condone the annihilation of one of its most ancient nations, the creator of a great culture and heir to exalted spiritual traditions.

Boris Nikolaevich, you did a great deal for Georgia in the hour of its most arduous ordeals. Perhaps the time has now come for you to speak out boldly in its defence. You will be speaking also in defence of your own Russia, for our peoples have always shared a common destiny.

I count on the help of the friendly Ukrainian people and its President, with whom I have signed a treaty on mutual assistance. I also pin my hopes on the solidarity of the peoples and republics of the former Soviet Union, of our historical neighbours: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran. I await help from our friends in the West.

I thank all those who have extended and who will extend a strong and friendly hand to Georgia, which is being forced into the abyss of annihilation.

In my aspiration to end the cold war and to bring down the walls of division and alienation, I fought for the freedom and independence of all

peoples, little suspecting that it would only be after the major threats to the existence of humankind has been removed that my own nation would face its darkest hour.

Perhaps there will be some who say that this is a cry of despair. No, if it is a cry, it is a cry from the heart, from my own heart and that of my people, and I want it to be heard. For humankind can never be content, can never enjoy the blessings of the world in tranquillity so long as one nation, albeit the very smallest, is threatened with annihilation.

I am writing this at 3 a.m. Shells are falling on the city; 1,500 homes have been destroyed. There is no water, no bread, no electricity and hopes are fading. The shelling continues. A moment ago several shells hit a maternity hospital, in which there were newborn infants and their mothers.

I am not bidding you farewell, I do not wish to say farewell. May God send you peace and happiness.

Eduard Shevardnadze

Sukhumi

18 September 1993

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/48/415
S/26473
20 September 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Items 34, 35, 85 and 86
of the provisional agenda*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS
AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES
IN THE NEAR EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS
OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 20 September 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Madagascar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Acting upon instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 17 September 1993 (see A/48/410-S/26465), I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the message of congratulations dated 13 September 1993 from His Excellency Mr. Albert Zafy, President of the Republic of Madagascar, addressed to His Excellency Mr. Ezer Weizmann, President of the State of Israel, following the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 34, 35, 85 and 86 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Noël RAKOTONDRAMBOA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/48/150 and Corr.1.

ANNEX

Letter dated 13 September 1993 from the President of Madagascar addressed to the President of Israel

The signing of the historic agreement of mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization gives me an opportunity to address to you the hearty congratulations of the Government and people of Madagascar.

This courageous decision by both parties constitutes a great step forward in the search for an overall political solution in the Near East.

That is why the Republic of Madagascar encourages the process of negotiations which is now in progress between the various parties and hopes that it will shortly be finalized by a general agreement which will be the prelude to a lasting peace in the region.

(Signed) Albert ZAFY
President of the Republic
of Madagascar

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26474
20 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

After the consultations held on 20 September 1993, the President of the Security Council issued the following statement on behalf of the members of the Council in connection with the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait":

"The members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 20 September 1993 pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991).

"After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of the consultations, the President of the Council concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for a modification of the regimes established in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), as referred to in paragraph 21 of that resolution."

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26475
20 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your report on your mission of good offices in Cyprus dated 14 September 1993 (S/26438) has been considered by the members of the Security Council.

The members of the Council have asked me to convey to you their continuing support for your efforts, and those of your Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative. They fully endorse your report and your observations on the current situation.

The members of the Council reiterate the obligation of both parties to cooperate with you fully and without further delay in reaching promptly an overall framework agreement on the package of proposals and, in the first instance, to arrive at an agreement on the package of proposals related to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport, which will create a climate more conducive to engaging in negotiations on the basis of the Set of ideas. The members of the Council note with concern that the Turkish Cypriot side has not yet shown the necessary goodwill and cooperation required to achieve an agreement.

The members of the Council express their deep disappointment that an agreement on the package has not yet been reached and agree that you cannot continue your current effort indefinitely. They call on the Turkish Cypriot side to give its active support to the effort. They also recognize the important role that Turkey could play in this effort.

The members of the Council agree that it is encouraging that there is widespread interest in the package among the Turkish Cypriot community. In this context, they support your proposals to send two technical teams to Cyprus to analyse the implications of the package, in the terms suggested in paragraph 20 of your report, and to identify the requirements for making Nicosia International Airport operational.

The members of the Council look forward to receiving the report requested in resolution 831 (1993), which will cover the outcome of your further efforts to achieve an agreement on the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package, including the results of the two technical missions. On the basis of

this report the members of the Council will undertake a thorough review of the situation and, if necessary, consider alternative ways to promote the implementation of the resolutions on Cyprus.

(Signed) Adolfo Raul TAYLHARDAT
President of the Security Council

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26476
22 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 755 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26317) of 17 August 1993,

Stressing the importance of continuing the peace process initiated by the Addis Ababa agreement and in this connection welcoming the efforts of African countries, the Organization of African Unity, in particular its Horn of Africa Standing Committee, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, in cooperation with and in support of the United Nations, to promote national reconciliation in Somalia,

Stressing the commitment of the international community to help Somalia regain a normal, peaceful life, while recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Expressing its appreciation for the improvements in the overall situation, which have been achieved by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), in particular, eradication of starvation, establishment of a large number of district councils, opening of schools and resumption by the Somali people in most areas of the country of their normal lives,

Recognizing the continuing need for broadbased consultations and consensus on basic principles to achieve national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions,

Calling upon all Somali parties, including movements and factions, to show the political will to achieve reconciliation, peace and security,

Recognizing that the highest priority for UNOSOM II is to assist the people of Somalia in the furtherance of the national reconciliation process and to promote and advance the re-establishment of regional and national institutions

and civil administration in the entire country, as set out in resolution 814 (1993),

Noting with great concern, despite the improvements in the overall situation in Somalia, continuing reports of violence in Mogadishu and the absence of law enforcement and judicial authorities and institutions in the country as a whole, and recalling the request to the Secretary-General in resolution 814 (1993) to assist in the re-establishment of the Somali police and the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability, and law and order,

Convinced that the re-establishment of the Somali police, and judicial and penal systems, is critical for the restoration of security and stability in the country,

Gravely concerned at the continuation of armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II, and recalling its resolution 814 (1993) which emphasized the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions,

A

1. Welcomes the reports by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in resolution 814 (1993);

2. Commends the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and all the personnel of UNOSOM II, for their achievements in greatly improving the conditions of the Somali people and beginning the process of nation-building apparent in the restoration in much of the country of stable and secure conditions in stark contrast with the prior suffering caused by inter-clan conflict;

3. Condemns all attacks on UNOSOM II personnel and reaffirms that those who have committed or have ordered the commission of such criminal acts will be held individually responsible for them;

4. Affirms the importance it attaches to the successful fulfilment on an urgent and accelerated basis of UNOSOM II's objectives of facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order, and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia, so that it can complete its mission by March 1995;

5. Requests, in that context, the Secretary-General to direct the urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities and to report thereon to the Council as soon as possible;

6. Urges the Secretary-General to re-double his efforts at the local, regional and national levels, including encouraging broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, to continue the process of national reconciliation and political settlement, and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy;

7. Calls on all Member States to assist, in all ways possible, including the urgent full staffing of UNOSOM II civil positions, the Secretary-General, in conjunction with regional organizations, in his efforts to reconcile the parties and rebuild Somali political institutions;

8. Invites the Secretary-General to consult the countries of the region and regional organizations concerned on means of further reinvigorating the reconciliation process;

B

9. Approves the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in annex I to his report of 17 August 1993 (S/26317) relating to the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems in accordance with resolution 814 (1993) and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps on an urgent and accelerated basis to implement them;

10. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to convene at the earliest possible date a meeting of Member States interested in supporting UNOSOM II in the re-establishment of the police, judicial and penal systems, for the purpose of determining specific requirements and identifying specific sources of support;

11. Further requests the Secretary-General to undertake actively and as a matter of great urgency an international recruiting programme for staffing the UNOSOM II Justice Division with police, judicial and penal system specialists;

12. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to maintain and utilize the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) and maintained in resolution 814 (1993) for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems in addition to the establishment of the Somali police, other than for the cost of international staff;

13. Urges Member States, on an urgent basis, to contribute to that fund or otherwise to provide assistance for the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems, including personnel, financial support, equipment and training to help attain the objectives outlined in annex I to the Secretary-General's report (S/26317);

14. Encourages the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure continuation of the current police, judicial and penal programme from October to the end of December 1993 until additional funding from Member States is forthcoming, and to make recommendations as appropriate to the General Assembly;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council fully informed on a regular basis on the implementation of this resolution;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26477
22 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 813 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and 856 (1993) of 10 August 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26422 and Add.1) dated 9 September 1993 on the proposed establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL),

Noting that the Peace Agreement signed by the three Liberian parties in Cotonou on 25 July 1993 calls on the United Nations and the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to assist in the implementation of the Agreement,

Emphasizing as noted in the Secretary-General's report of 4 August 1993 (S/26200), that the Peace Agreement assigns ECOMOG the primary responsibility of supervising the implementation of the military provisions of the Agreement and envisages that the United Nations role shall be to monitor and verify this process,

Noting that this would be the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case ECOWAS,

Recognizing that United Nations involvement would contribute significantly to the effective implementation of the Peace Agreement and would serve to underline the international community's commitment to conflict resolution in Liberia,

Commending ECOWAS for its continuing efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia,

Commending also the efforts of the Organization of African Unity in support of the peace process in Liberia,

Stressing the importance of full cooperation and close coordination between UNOMIL and ECOMOG in the implementation of their respective mandates,

Taking note of the deployment of an advance team of United Nations military observers to Liberia as authorized under resolution 856 (1993),

Welcoming the establishment of the Joint Cease-Fire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) composed of the three Liberian parties, ECOMOG and the United Nations,

Welcoming also the formation in Cotonou on 27 August 1993 of the five-member Council of States representing all three Liberian parties, which, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, shall be installed concomitantly with the commencement of the disarmament process and shall be responsible for the day-to-day operation of the transitional Government,

Noting that the Peace Agreement calls for legislative and presidential elections to take place approximately seven months after the signing of the Peace Agreement,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 9 September 1993 (S/26422) on the proposed establishment of UNOMIL;

2. Decides to establish UNOMIL under its authority and under the direction of the Secretary-General through his Special Representative for a period of seven months, subject to the proviso that it will continue beyond 16 December 1993 only upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General on whether or not substantive progress has been made towards the implementation of the Peace Agreement and other measures aimed at establishing a lasting peace;

3. Decides that UNOMIL shall comprise military observers as well as medical, engineering, communications, transportation and electoral components, in the numbers indicated in the Secretary-General's report, together with minimal staff necessary to support it, and shall have the following mandate:

(a) To receive and investigate all reports on alleged incidents of violations of the cease-fire agreement and, if the violation cannot be corrected, to report its findings to the Violations Committee established pursuant to the Peace Agreement and to the Secretary-General;

(b) To monitor compliance with other elements of the Peace Agreement, including at points on Liberia's borders with Sierra Leone and other neighbouring countries, and to verify its impartial application, and in particular to assist in the monitoring of compliance with the embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment to Liberia and the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants;

(c) To observe and verify the election process, including the legislative and presidential elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement;

(d) To assist, as appropriate, in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in the field in conjunction with the existing United Nations humanitarian relief operation;

(e) To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for the demobilization of combatants;

(f) To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary-General;

(g) To train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and, in cooperation with ECOMOG, coordinate the identification of mines and assist in the clearance of mines and unexploded bombs;

(h) Without participation in enforcement operations, to coordinate with ECOMOG in the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities both formally, through the Violations Committee, and informally;

4. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to conclude with the Chairman of ECOWAS an agreement defining, before deployment of UNOMIL, the roles and responsibilities of UNOMIL and ECOWAS in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, in accordance with the concept of operations outlined in Chapter IV of the Secretary-General's report (S/26422), and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the progress and outcome of the negotiations leading thereto;

5. Encourages African States to provide the additional troops requested from them by ECOWAS for ECOMOG;

6. Welcomes the steps taken by the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund, which would facilitate the sending of reinforcements by African States to ECOMOG, assist in supporting troops of participating ECOMOG countries and also assist in mine-clearing, humanitarian and development activities, as well as the electoral process, and calls on Member States to support the peace process in Liberia by contributing to the Trust Fund;

7. Urges the Liberian parties to commence the encampment, disarmament and demobilization process without delay;

8. Welcomes the decision to establish the transitional government and urges also the Liberian parties to begin the exercise of that government's responsibilities concomitantly with the process described in paragraph 7 above and consistent with the Peace Agreement;

9. Calls on the transitional government to conclude expeditiously, and no later than 60 days after its installation, a Status of Mission Agreement with the United Nations to facilitate the full deployment of UNOMIL;

10. Urges the Liberian parties to finalize the composition of the Elections Commission so that it can promptly undertake the necessary preparations for legislative and presidential elections by March 1994, at the latest, in accordance with the timetable foreseen in the Peace Agreement;

11. Calls on the Liberian parties to cooperate fully in the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country by the most direct routes, in accordance with the Peace Agreement;

12. Welcomes ECOMOG's stated commitment to ensure the safety of UNOMIL observers and civilian staff and urges the Liberian parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and safety of UNOMIL personnel, as well as of the personnel involved in relief operations, and strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to submit progress reports to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution by 16 December 1993 and by 16 February 1994;

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26478
21 September 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

JOINT NOTE VERBALE DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Georgia to the United Nations and the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations present their compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and have the honour to request that the joint letter dated 7 September 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia, Mr. A. D. Chikvaidze, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. A. V. Kozyrev, addressed to the Secretary-General (see enclosure) be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Joint letter dated 13 September 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations and the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a joint letter dated 7 September 1993 addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Mr. A. D. Chikvaidze, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. A. V. Kozyrev (see enclosure).

(Signed) P. CHKHEIDZE
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Georgia
to the United Nations

(Signed) Yu. VORONTSOV
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

Enclosure

[Original: Russian]

Joint letter dated 7 September 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General

Our letter to you is motivated by the persisting unstable situation in the area of the Abkhaz conflict and by our desire to give new impetus to the peace process in Abkhazia, with the active participation of the United Nations.

The first steps along the path to peace have already been taken. The Sochi cease-fire agreement of 27 July 1993 is generally being observed. The withdrawal of troops and matériel is continuing and the process of separating the opposing forces has begun. This is being considerably facilitated by the hard work performed by the tripartite Russian-Georgian-Abkhaz bodies set up pursuant to the Sochi agreement, namely, the Joint Commission on the settlement in Abkhazia and the interim monitoring groups. They have been joined in these efforts by the advance team of United Nations Observers, whose deployment marks an important step forward in promoting implementation of the agreement.

It is clear to us that the durability of the cease-fire regime will depend to a large extent on the effective involvement of the international community in ensuring its observance. Favourable conditions for this have been created by resolutions 849 (1993) and 854 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council. It is our hope that, at this crucial stage, the international community, acting through the United Nations, will manifest its full support for the quest for peace.

The Russian Federation and Georgia strongly believe in the imperative need for the speediest possible deployment to Abkhazia of full contingent of United Nations Observers, in accordance with your recommendations, and we welcome the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 858 (1993) on this matter. It is essential that the United Nations observers should cooperate as closely as possible with the interim monitoring groups of the Joint Commission.

In order to ensure that the stated goals are effectively attained, we are prepared to consider merging these groups (which could, if necessary, be "reinforced") with the United Nations Observer Mission to Georgia (UNOMIG), and making the machinery as a whole answerable to the Security Council.

Since the situation remains precarious, additional measures may be necessary. The chances of definitively ending the conflict will be increased with the deployment of international peace-keeping forces. In accordance with the letter sent to you on 8 August 1993 by the Joint Commission on the settlement in Abkhazia, their numerical strength and composition could be determined by agreement between the sides. If necessary, the Russian military contingent temporarily deployed in the conflict zone could be used for these purposes at the initial stage. In this connection, we are in favour of starting substantive consultations with the United Nations as provided for by article 5

of the cease-fire agreement and paragraph 6 of your report of 6 August 1993 (S/26250).

Naturally the measures which we propose above must go hand in hand with the opening of negotiations, as soon as possible, on a comprehensive settlement of the conflict under the auspices of the United Nations and with the Russian Federation as facilitator.

We request that you take due account of these considerations when submitting your recommendations to the Security Council.

A. KOZYREV
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation

A. CHIKVAIDZE
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Georgia

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26479
21 September 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 17 September 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. A. V. Kozyrev, addressed to you on the question of confidence-building measures between the parties in conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and request you to have it circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. VORONTSOV

Annex

Letter dated 17 September 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General

I have just visited Sarajevo and should like to inform you about my impressions and share with you certain ideas that came about as a result of talks with the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs.

The situation in Sarajevo seems calmer than it was during my visit to the city in May of last year, although there is considerably more destruction and the sound of shooting can still be heard.

Members of all the communities in the city are now equally concerned about one problem: the approaching winter. This general feeling of anxiety, it seems, is moving the parties towards a dialogue on issues that are quite specific.

By making use of this situation, it would be possible to take a number of steps to strengthen confidence-building measures between the parties in conflict, utilizing the potential of the United Nations Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The following is a set of measures, some of which have been included, as a result of our common efforts in Sarajevo and Geneva, in the joint declaration on the conditions for signing a peace agreement, which was adopted by the Muslim and Serb parties, while others require additional steps and assistance on the part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR):

1. Establishment of a direct telephone line between Sarajevo and Pale in order to make effective contact.

The Muslim and Serb sides agree in principle on this.

2. Opening of new routes for the delivery of humanitarian assistance through territory under Serb control, including routes to areas that are now blocked as a result of fighting between Muslims and Croats.

The Russian side is prepared to provide three to five civilian monitors to accompany the convoys.

3. Establishment of a joint commission made up of representatives of the parties and UNPROFOR in order to resolve questions relating to restoration of the city's water and power supply.

The Serbs have expressed their readiness to supply Sarajevo with fuel (firewood and coal) "for a modest fee" or arrange its transshipment from other areas of Bosnia through territory under their control.

4. Establishment in Sarajevo of three check-points for unimpeded passage by citizens as a first step towards making Sarajevo an open city.

5. Obtaining permission to purchase 6,000 tons of salt and 2,000 tons of oil in order to maintain the normal condition of roads and ensure the movement of humanitarian convoys over them during the winter period.

This is a request by the Serb side.

6. Transfer of school textbooks to the Muslim side in exchange for Serb objects of cultural value situated in Sarajevo.

This is a proposal by the Serb side.

7. Establishment of "medical corridors" between hospitals in the area of Sarajevo (from Ilidža to Lukavica for the Serb side and from Hrasnica to Koševo for the Muslim side).

8. Assistance in obtaining authorization from the Security Council Committee on sanctions for the delivery of 10,000 tons of fuel oil to heat schools, hospitals and kindergartens during the winter.

This is a request by the Serb side.

It seems that these measures could help stabilize the situation around Sarajevo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general and bring us closer to a final settlement of this bloody conflict.

I request you to bring my letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council as well as the senior officials of UNPROFOR, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

A. KOZYREV
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26480
21 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HAITI

Introduction

1. In my report dated 25 August 1993 (S/26352), I recommended to the Security Council the establishment of a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for an initial period of six months to help implement the Governors Island Agreement concluded on 3 July 1993 between the President of the Republic of Haiti, Reverend Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, General Raoul Cédras.

2. After reviewing that report, the Security Council adopted resolution 862 (1993), in which, inter alia, it requested a further report from the Secretary-General on the proposed establishment of UNMIH, including, in particular, a detailed estimate of the cost and scope of this operation, a time-frame for its implementation, and the projected conclusion of the operation, and how to ensure coordination between it and the work of the Organization of American States (OAS). The present report responds to the Council's request for such additional information.

I. ADVANCE TEAM TO HAITI

3. In paragraph 2 of its resolution 862 (1993), the Security Council approved the early dispatch of an advance team of not more than 30 personnel to assess requirements and prepare for the possible dispatch of both the civilian police and military assistance components of the proposed United Nations Mission in Haiti. Accordingly, an advance team, headed by my Special Envoy, Mr. Dante Caputo, and also including my Military Adviser, Major General Maurice Baril, as well as a number of military, police and civilian specialists, travelled to Haiti on 8 September 1993.

4. The mandate of the advance team was twofold: first, the team was instructed to undertake a detailed survey as a basis for the preparation of the present report; and second, a small group of military and police officers remained in Haiti after the return of the main body of the advance team on 12 September 1993, with the task of making preparations for the eventual deployment of the Mission in Haiti subject to the approval of the Security Council.

5. During their stay in Haiti, my Special Envoy, and the senior members of his team met with a number of Haitian officials representing the Constitutional Government, as well as the Armed Forces. These officials included both Prime Minister Robert Malval and senior members of his Cabinet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, General Raoul Cédras and members of his General Staff.

6. Both sides confirmed their desire to pursue the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, including those provisions which foresee the participation of the United Nations.

7. Notwithstanding the assurances given by both sides regarding their readiness to cooperate with the United Nations in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Governors Island Agreement, they continue to be divided by deep mistrust and suspicion. It was clear to the advance team that that divide needs to be bridged on an urgent basis in order for tangible progress to be achieved towards the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. Meanwhile, the political and social climate in Haiti continues to be characterized by widespread violations of human rights and other instances of violence. In these circumstances, in the opinion of my Special Envoy, there is an urgent need to demonstrate through concrete steps the commitment of the international community to the solution of the Haitian crisis. I fully concur with my Special Envoy in this regard. It is my hope, therefore, that the Security Council, on the basis of the additional information provided in the present report, will agree to the urgent establishment of UNMIH in line with my earlier recommendations.

II. ASSISTANCE IN THE POLICE SECTOR

8. As was mentioned in my report dated 25 August 1993, although the present Haitian Constitution provides for a police force separate from the Armed Forces, at the present time the responsibility of the Armed Forces of Haiti encompasses both military and police functions. In accordance with paragraph 7 of the Governors Island Agreement and paragraph 4 of the New York Pact of 16 July 1993, a law is to be adopted by the Haitian Parliament, by way of extraordinary procedure, to establish a new police force. Paragraph 5 of the Governors Island Agreement calls for the presence of United Nations personnel to assist in the establishment of the new force. Pending the creation and training of the new Haitian Police, President Aristide, in his letter of 24 July 1993, requested the United Nations to provide advice and assistance for the purposes of improving the functioning of the existing security forces, with particular reference to respect for human rights.

9. The main objective of the United Nations cooperation in the police sector is to assist in the establishment and organization of a national police force separate from the Armed Forces. In the first phase, pending the creation of such a police force, the police members of UNMIH would monitor the performance of the existing security forces. In particular, United Nations police monitors would verify that the existing security forces respect human rights as well as the letter and spirit of the political accord. This initial phase of the Mission is estimated to require six months. As soon as feasible, and if possible before the completion of the initial phase, the scope of UNMIH

activities in the police sector would be expanded to include training of the members of the new police force.

10. Requirements of further assistance for training in the police sector will depend on the progress achieved during the first phase. It is my intention to present recommendations in this regard to the Council before the expiry of the mandate of UNMIH should the Council decide to establish the Mission for an initial period of six months.

11. The advance team concluded that 567 United Nations police monitors would be the minimum strength required to accomplish the tasks established for the police component.

12. For the organizational purpose of the police component, the territory of Haiti would be divided into four administrative divisions, with headquarters in Port-au-Prince. United Nations police monitors would be present in all departmental capitals. To the extent possible, United Nations police monitors would be deployed at the same locations as the United Nations/OAS Civilian Monitors of the Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH).

13. The Police Act currently under consideration in the Haitian Parliament envisages the integration of the police into the fabric of local communities and the encouragement of the development of a partnership between the police and the communities they serve. It is essential for United Nations police monitors to adapt their deployment and modus operandi accordingly. This would create public awareness among the Haitians as to what the relationship ought to be between the police and the citizens they serve in a democratic country.

14. It is understood that the functions of United Nations police monitors in Haiti will be strictly limited to monitoring and training. At the same time, it is my expectation that, through their presence and the example they will be setting, the United Nations police monitors will have a favourable impact on the manner in which police work is carried out in Haiti.

III. ASSISTANCE FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

15. In my report dated 25 August 1993 (S/26532), I had indicated that a military component including a construction unit with a strength of approximately 500 and a training team of 60, would be required in order to implement the tasks of the military component of UNMIH. Based on its detailed assessment of the related requirements, the advance team concluded that the strength of this component, including military trainers, would need to be increased to approximately 700.

16. The military assistance operation will be carried out in three phases: the first consisting of the movement of military units and the installation of a base camp; the second covering training of military personnel in various disciplines and the initiation of engineering and medical assistance projects; and the third and final phase would expand training, as well as engineering and medical projects enabling the Haitian military personnel to apply their newly acquired skills. It is estimated that all of these activities can be conducted simultaneously and be completed within six months.

17. The training which will be provided to the Haitian Armed Forces is intended to enhance their capabilities in non-combat skills essentially in areas relating to disaster preparedness and relief. Parallel with the activities outlined above, it is envisaged by the Haitian authorities that the Armed Forces will be reorganized into five battalions, including service support units, and be deployed throughout the country.

IV. COORDINATION BETWEEN UNMIH AND MICIVIH

18. My Special Representative (see para. 20 below) will be responsible for coordinating the work of UNMIH and of MICIVIH, both of which will function under his overall authority. Specifically, the United Nations police monitors will work in collaboration with the Department of Investigation and Research within the Human Rights Division of MICIVIH. Furthermore, MICIVIH would provide an orientation course for the United Nations police monitors, drawing on its experience in training its own civilian observers and its familiarity with the Haitian political and social environment.

19. The organizational structure of MICIVIH would remain essentially unchanged, with the Executive Director of MICIVIH reporting directly to the Special Representative. The MICIVIH budget will remain separate from that of UNMIH, retaining its funding through the regular budget of the Organization and continuing its special budgetary and operational arrangements with OAS. The United Nations administrative component of MICIVIH will continue to provide full support to MICIVIH, but will be augmented so as to give it the capacity to support UNMIH as well. This single administration would, as a result, be removed from the organizational structure of MICIVIH to form a separate component catering to both entities under the authority of my Special Representative. While details of the costing arrangements for this dual role remain to be finalized, it is envisioned that the related costs would be shared between the two budgets.

V. STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

20. Should the Security Council authorize the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti, it would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The Mission would be led in the field by my Special Representative, Mr. Dante Caputo, who has been my Special Envoy, and would be composed of police and military contingents. Commanders of those contingents would report to me through my Special Representative. The UNMIH police and military contingents would be composed of personnel made available by Member States. UNMIH would coordinate its activities closely with MICIVIH.

21. In accordance with established practice, UNMIH would need to have freedom of movement and communications and to enjoy other rights that would be necessary for the performance of its tasks in Haiti. UNMIH and its personnel would also have to be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. A status of mission agreement would be signed with the Government of Haiti to facilitate the

early dispatch of the Mission, as envisaged in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 862 (1993).

22. The security of UNMIH personnel needs to be carefully considered, bearing in mind the current situation in Haiti. There are frequent examples of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, beatings and other mistreatment of detainees and prisoners, arbitrary arrest and detention, and interference with the judicial process. Violence is often used to disperse popular assemblies, be they political, civic or religious in nature. The existing hazards are aggravated by the inability of local authorities to respond adequately to widespread instances of armed banditry and other acts of violence. I shall appoint a Security Adviser to coordinate the security requirements of the entire United Nations presence in the country.

23. Bearing in mind the dispersal of UNMIH personnel throughout the territory of Haiti, logistical requirements will be considerable for both the military and police components, including a minimum of 7 helicopters, 323 overland vehicles and 6 Zodiac-type watercraft, as well as a 24-hour communications system. The construction battalion would be deployed with its own specialized equipment.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

24. The most important immediate task for the establishment and maintenance of stability in Haiti is adherence to and implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. The United Nations will supplement the efforts of the people of Haiti to establish peace and democracy in their country.

25. My recommendations for the deployment of UNMIH have been developed with a view to ensuring that the operation is cost-effective. The cost estimate for the Mission is $55.2 million. The increase over the provisional estimate included in my earlier report of 25 August 1993 is mainly attributable to the addition of seven helicopters and other heavy equipment deemed essential for both components of the Mission. The budget estimate has also increased as a result of the inclusion of the staff of the Special Representative's Office responsible for the overall supervision and management of the Mission.

26. I shall submit an addendum to the present report as soon as possible, providing a statement of the financial implications for UNMIH. Some elements of the activities envisaged in my report of 25 August 1993 and the present one, such as the cost of construction material and other expenditures not normally financed from assessed contributions in peace-keeping missions, will have to be funded separately through the establishment of trust funds or other arrangements.

27. The assumption of office by Prime Minister Malval on 31 August 1993 marked the fulfilment of the principal conditions laid down in the Governors Island Agreement for the commencement of United Nations cooperation in its implementation. As indicated above, I share the view of my Special Envoy that there is now an urgent need to proceed with the activities foreseen to be undertaken by UNMIH. It is my recommendation, therefore, that the Security Council approve the establishment of UNMIH for an initial period of six months

with the mandate and functions described in my report of 25 August 1993 and further elaborated in the present report.

28. As mentioned earlier, I anticipate the need for a second phase of assistance to train the members of the new police force to be established. I shall present proposals to that effect before the end of the first phase of six months. While the exact duration of such a second and final phase remains to be determined, I do not expect it to exceed three months.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26480/Add.1
22 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING HAITI

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

1. In my report to the Security Council of 21 September 1993 (S/26480), I indicated in paragraph 26 that I would submit, as soon as possible, an addendum to the report including a statement of the financial implications for the United Nations Mission in Haiti.

2. Should the Security Council approve my recommendation for the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti, it is estimated that the total cost of the operation for a six-month period would amount to $49,856,000 gross 1/ and would include 99 international and 271 local civilian staff, 700 military contingent personnel, including military trainers and 567 police monitors. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

3. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, that should the Security Council decide to establish the United Nations Mission in Haiti, the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to a special account to be established for this purpose.

Notes

1/ The figure of $55.2 million in paragraph 25 of the main report should have been $49.9 million.

Annex

Cost estimates for the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti for an initial period of six months

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Objects of expenditure		Amount
1.	Military component	
	(a) Contingent personnel	7 173.0
	(b) Other costs pertaining to contingents	1 500.0
2.	Civilian police and training	8 608.0
3.	Civilian personnel	6 476.0
4.	Premises, rental and maintenance	3 537.0
5.	Vehicle operations	5 156.0
6.	Aircraft operations	9 197.0
7.	Sea operations	67.0
8	Communications and other equipment	4 834.0
9.	Public information	205.0
10.	Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs	3 103.0
	Total	49 856.0

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26481
21 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ERITREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to submit a "Statement on Somalia" which reflects the position of the Government of Eritrea on the situation in Somalia.

Excellency, I request that this statement be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hagos GHEBREHIWET
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

Annex

Statement dated 17 September 1993 on Somalia

The Government of Eritrea is gravely concerned about recent developments and the rapidly deteriorating situation in Somalia. A humanitarian intervention which started out with so much promise and solid, all-round support has been marred by escalating military conflict, the killing of peace-keeping troops and the rise in casualties among the civilian population, including women and children. Support for, and confidence in, the Somali intervention is being eroded, which, we believe, is detrimental to the whole operation.

In the recent IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought Development) Summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 6 to 7 September, the Heads of State of the countries of the Horn of Africa, while applauding the "positive achievements of the United Nations in Somalia", stressed that "caution is required in handling the current very complicated political situation". The Summit also called for "a more meaningful consultation between UNOSOM and the countries of the subregion and a more active role on the part of the countries of the subregion."

Consistent with the stance of the Heads of State of the seven IGADD member countries and in the light of the continually deteriorating situation in Somalia, the Government of Eritrea urges that every effort be made to avoid a military showdown which is bound to result in heavy civilian casualties and will not contribute to the resolution of the underlying issues. It is our conviction that a peaceful solution to the issue concerning General Mohamed Farah Aidid is the only viable one and urge that all peace efforts towards that end be continued and be given a chance. We strongly believe that the international community should not be side-tracked and that the focus should once again return to the fundamental humanitarian and political issues, which were addressed positively in the March 1993 Addis Ababa Accords.

The Government of Eritrea reiterates that within its very modest capabilities, it will continue to exert itself to make a positive contribution to the international and regional efforts for peace and reconciliation in tormented Somalia.